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In this article we account for the way plants respond to salient features of their
environment under the free-energy principle for biological systems. Biological
self-organization amounts to the minimization of surprise over time. We posit
that any self-organizing system must embody a generative model whose
predictions ensure that (expected) free energy is minimized through action.
Plants respond in a fast, and yet coordinatedmanner, to environmental contin-
gencies. They pro-actively sample their local environment to elicit information
with an adaptive value. Our main thesis is that plant behaviour takes place by
way of a process (active inference) that predicts the environmental sources
of sensory stimulation. This principle, we argue, endows plants with a
form of perception that underwrites purposeful, anticipatory behaviour. The
aim of the article is to assess the prospects of a radical predictive processing
story that would follow naturally from the free-energy principle for biological
systems; an approach that may ultimately bear upon our understanding of life
and cognition more broadly.1. Introduction
The emergent field of ‘plant neurobiology’ [1,2] studies the flexible and adap-
tive behaviour of plants beyond the domains of plant biochemistry/cellular
and molecular biology mechanistic approaches. The cognitive sciences have,
up until now, been neglectful of the plant world. But, as it turns out, plants
exhibit marks of intelligence [3], and are thus subject, in principle, to theoretical
and empirical scrutiny with tools that have been hitherto restricted to the
cognitive sciences [4].
The behaviour of plants is reversible, and soft-wired in amanner that responds
to metabolically salient features of the environment [5]. Plants can navigate many
vectors (not just light and gravity), where the implicit multimodal integration
partly accounts for the adaptive responses observed. The capacity for foresight
may be crucial to optimize fitness: some roots and shoots can anticipate the
future, competing for patchily distributed resources, and growing, branching and
flowering differentially depending upon the prospective acquisition of minerals,
water and light, amongmanyother vectors [6]. For instance,manyplants canantici-
pate future shade, initiating phenotypic changes in response to far-red/red light
cues ahead of time [7]. Cuscuta (dodder) attaches to plants, coiling around them
and developing haustoria that can penetrate their hosts’ vascular systems and
thereby suck up nutrients. Cuscuta optimizes fitness by deciding how much
energy to invest in coiling around a host with respect to the overall nutrient
intakeyet to be obtained [8].Manymore examples of decision-making—that antici-
pates reward—exist in the literature [7–11], but for present purposes we only need
tobear inmind that plants (appear to) exhibit anticipatory, goal-directedbehaviour.
In this context, the philosophy of plant neurobiology [4] proposes to assess
plant intelligence by framing an integrated view of plant signalling and adaptive
behaviour, and to account for the way plants perceive and act purposefully under
different paradigms. It is in this setting that we consider the theoretical possibility
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Although with an eye to the design of experimental protocols,
such prospects have already been explored elsewhere [13],1 in
a further twist, we elaborate on the possibility that plant
neurobiology may throw a distinctive light upon the more
or less radical form that such predictive machinery may
take. The overall aim of this paper, once zoo-centric and
neuro-centric biases have been set aside, is to assess the pro-
spects of a really radical (plant) predictive processing; an
approach that may ultimately bear upon our understanding
of life and cognition more broadly.J.R.Soc.Interface
14:201700962. The predictive processing basics, thus far
The notion of a general (biotic) radical predictive processing
story follows naturally from the free-energy principle for
biological systems [14]. The free-energy principle is the math-
ematical back-story behind predictive processing and active
inference in the neurosciences [15]. In brief, the free-energy
principle starts with the premise that biological systems
resist the second law of thermodynamics by restricting them-
selves to a small number of attracting states. In other words,
the nature of living things can be expressed in terms of a
high probability of being in a small number of (characteristic)
states and a very low probability of occupying all other states.
This somewhat abstract notion has some important if subtle
implications. For example, if we define surprise (also known
as self information or surprisal) as the negative log probability
that a plant—or any biological system—will be found in a
particular state, then one can cast biological self-organization
as minimizing surprise over time. Formally, the time average
of surprise or surprisal is called an action. This means that
biological systems conform to Hamilton’s principle of least
(or more exactly, stationary) action.
The (time) average of surprise is also known as uncertainty
(or entropy in information theoretic terms). This means that the
defining hallmark of biological systems is a tendency to resolve
uncertainty or, from the point of view of stochastic thermo-
dynamics, minimize entropy (hence resisting the second
law). Free energy gets into the game by providing a proxy or
bound approximation for surprise that living systems canmini-
mize explicitly [16]. Under certain simplifying assumptions,
the prediction error—that is celebrated in predictive coding for-
mulations of predictive processing [17,18]—can be regarded as
the free energy or surprise. There is one final interpretation of
surprise that we will appeal to later. Mathematically, surprise
is the negative log marginal likelihood or Bayesian model evi-
dence. This means that by minimizing surprise, free energy
or prediction error, a plant—and indeed you—maximizes
Bayesian model evidence. In other words, plants behave like
little statisticians, making implicit inferences about their
world through changes in their internal states. In cognitive
neuroscience, this leads to the Bayesian brain hypothesis
[19–23]. So what does this (Bayesian plant hypothesis) mean
for self-organization in plants?
Froma technical perspective, there is no distinction between
abrain, a plant, a cell ororganelle [23,24].All are just examples of
systems that self-organize according to the free-energy
principle. In otherwords, they exchangewith their environment
in a way that minimizes surprise and resolves uncertainty.
Generally, this reduction of surprise can be described from
two perspectives; reflecting the circular causality induced byan embodied exchange of the organism with its environment.
These two processes correspond to perceptual and active infer-
ence. Perceptual inference corresponds to adjusting internal
states to provide better predictions, while active inference is
the complementary process of sampling the environment to
make (sensory) samples match predictions. Perceptual and
active inference entail each other—both in the service of mini-
mizing surprise. From the outset, one can see that active
inference has an enactive or embodied aspect that is a necessary
consequence of any sentient system in (thermodynamically
open) exchange with its environment [14].
Two key issues will figure centrally in our arguments. The
first pertains to the notion of a generative model. Irrespective of
the particular processes in play, the notion of a prediction calls
upon amodel that generates predictions. This is usually associ-
ated with the internal states of a creature or plant that come
to recapitulate causal structure in external or environmental
states generating sensory samples. This recapitulation does
not necessarily have to be isomorphic and may, or may not,
be representational in nature. However, in accord with the
good regulator theorem [25], the one thing we know is that
the embodied structure of any biological system must in
some way be a good match for the eco-niche in which it
is immersed.
The second issue is the nature of free energy or prediction
error minimization. This can be cast at a number of levels
that speak to an inherent anticipatory exchange with the
environment. At its simplest, the minimization of surprise can
be regarded (in dynamical systems) as a gradient descent.
Crucially, this gradient descent progresses in generalized
coordinates of motion (for example, in terms of position and
momentum) [26,27]. This lends the suppression of prediction
errors a dynamical and anticipatory aspect; in the sense that a
sentient system is not simply reducing prediction error but
pursuing trajectories that have the least free energy. In other
words, it is not just a question of changing to reduce surprise
but choosing actions that will reduce expected surprise in the
future (notice that expected surprise is, mathematically,
the same as the average surprise which, we have established,
is entropy or uncertainty). We will see a nice example of
this below when we consider how plants respond to time-
dependent changes in salt concentrations. One can take this
argument to its extreme and posit that any self-organizing
system must embody a generative model whose predictions
ensure that expected free energy or uncertainty is minimized through
action [28]. Our basic argument is that this principle endows
plants with a purposeful behaviour that is quintessentially
anticipatory in nature. See figure 1 for a summary of the techni-
cal principles that underlie active inference and free-energy
minimization.3. Plant predictive processing—or ways to avoid
salty surprises
Because the overt behaviour of plants is in general not
obvious to the naked eye, we tend to think of them as
bottom-up energy receptacles; information-processors that
just sit back and wait for the world to bring news hopefully
relevant to their doings. But to survive, plants rely on the ver-
idical perception of their surroundings. To do so, predicting
their own states of sensory stimulation, and not merely react-
ing to them, proves critical [12]. In this way, plants are subject
the free-energy principle
sensation
internal
states
plant
action
environment
external
states
F = energy – entropy = – ·ln p(s,h)Òq + ·ln q (h)Òq
a = arg min F (s, m)
a
m = arg min F (s, m)
mh· = f (h, a) + w
s = g(h, a) + w
action to minimize a bound on surprise perception to optimize the bound
F = complexity – accuracy
   = D(q  p(h))– ·ln p(s(a)|h)Òq
a = arg max accuracy
              
a
F = divergence + surprise
   = D(q (h : m)  p(h | s)) – ln p(s)
m = arg min divergence
          
m
Figure 1. Upper panel: schematic of the quantities that define free energy. These include the internal states of a system m (e.g. a plant) and quantities describing
exchange with the world; namely, sensory input s ¼ gðh, aÞ þ v and action a that changes the way the environment is sampled. The environment is described
by equations of motion, _h ¼ f ðh, aÞ þ v, that specify the dynamics of (hidden) states of the world h. Here, v denotes random fluctuations. Internal states and
action both change to minimize free energy, which is a function of sensory input and a probabilistic representation (recognition density) qðh:mÞ encoded by
internal states. Lower panel: alternative expressions for the free energy illustrating what its minimization entails. For action, free energy can only be suppressed
by increasing the accuracy of sensory data (i.e. selectively sampling data that are predicted by the representation). Conversely, optimizing internal states make the
representation an approximate conditional density on the causes of sensory input (by minimizing divergence). This optimization makes the free-energy bound on
surprise tighter and enables action to avoid surprising sensations. (Online version in colour.)
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sing principles just reviewed. Since active inference suggests
some formof agency, plants, like animals, appear to be engaged
in pro-active sampling of their local environment for the sake of
generating information with an adaptive value (i.e. reducing
uncertainty or avoiding surprises). In fact, plants are constantly,
and tirelessly, swaying their organs towards energy gradients,
doing their best to realize the most likely (least surprising)
implications of the surrounding sensory stimulation for
subsequent engagement with the world.
The main thesis of plant predictive processing (PPP) is that
plant behaviour takes place bywayof a process that predicts the
environmental sources of sensory stimulation.According to this
picture, a plant’s predictions would propagate backwards to its
effector organs (substrate details are reviewed in the next
section). When a mismatch between the prediction generated
and the incoming signal takes place, that is, when there is a pre-
diction error, the mismatch is propagated upwards, into the
plant internal infrastructure. With this strategy, plants could,
in principle, minimize the divergence between the predictions
(empirical bets) about sensory signals and the actual signal
supplied by the environment. Plant perception could thus
boil down to a process whereby environmental input is
matched to top-down predictions. There are several (free
energy compliant) schemes one could invoke to explain this be-
haviour. Perhaps the simplest and subtlest is to simply ‘explore’
when prediction errors are high. In other words, whenpredictions match signals from the plants, actively sampling
of the eco-niche is suspended (no more error needs to be mini-
mized). Conversely, if prediction errors are high, the plant
‘knows’ its current ‘behaviour’ is producing surprising out-
comes and that there is at least one surprise reducing,
prediction fulfilling response; namely, ‘get out of here’. This
simple form of optimization is ubiquitous in self-organization:
in theoretical evolution, it is formally related to second order
selection (also known as selection for selectability) [29,30]. In
cognitive neuroscience, it has been referred to in terms of auto-
vitiation (i.e. the destruction of self-induced but surprising fixed
points of attraction) [31]. Genetic algorithms that use this sort of
scheme include adaptive stochastic optimization procedures.
Remarkably, recent advances in these optimization schemes
have been inspired by plant (weed) behaviour [32]!
Note, we are not simply saying that plants indulge them-
selves using adaptive stochastic optimization, we are saying
that there are simple but powerful schemes that can resolve
the prediction errors afforded by the capacity to predict.
This or related forms of self-organization based upon predic-
tions are what we end up calling active ‘plant perception’. It
basically boils down to the selection of actions that best mini-
mizes surprise expected under those actions. This means that
behaviour is driven by the resolution of uncertainty—with an
eye to ensuring that a flexible, surprise avoiding, sampling
of sensory inputs fits their plastic phenotype (or, in free-
energy parlance, fits prior beliefs embodied in their physical
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hypotheses as to what is out there: it could be a herbivore
representing bad news [33], it could be a stream of water
[34], or what may.
Anticipatory plant behaviour has been tested at the root
level with, for example, pea roots responding in a timely way
to environmental contingencies. In particular, pea plants
exposed to dynamic nutrient regimes are observed to develop
more roots in patches with an increasing level of nutrients,
despite those patches being less rich in absolute terms than
others that were nevertheless static (with no nutrient increase).
As [7] observes: ‘These findings demonstrate that rather than
responding to mere absolute resource availabilities, plants are
able to perceive and integrate information regarding dynamic
changes in resource levels and utilize it to anticipate growth
conditions in ways that maximize their long-term perform-
ance’ (p. 63). Roots don’t simply just grow. They constantly
assess the (future) acquisition of minerals and water.
Or consider, for the sake of illustration under PPP, halotropic
(salt-avoiding) root behaviour [35]. Ionic/osmotic stress
brought about by high concentrations of salt in the soil can
disrupt, rather badly, the biochemical machinery of plant
cells, affecting photosynthesis rates and protein synthesis,
among other key processes. Roots have also been observed to
exhibit random agravitropic responses under salt stress [35].
Generally speaking, salt means high ‘surprise’ to plants.
In this way, we may cash out roots’ exposure to salt in terms
of surprise states. How then are we to proceed?
First, we need to bear in mind that being in a state of
surprise, or not, is specific to each phenotype and individual.
We tend to think of plants as a monolithic category, but differ-
ent plants (not to mention different plant species) have their
own needs and their own means to get around. Put simply,
what is surprising for one plant species/individual may not
be for another. In fact, salt-avoidance may even mean a com-
forting familiar (low surprise) outcome to some species!
Think of land species based in seashore intertidal zones,
estuaries, and the like, which have adapted to tolerate salt.2
Plants have a number of tools at their disposal to copewith
salt stress. Some plants efflux salt from shoot meristems and
from the more active leaves, in terms of photosynthetic poten-
tial. Those unable to do so have developed tolerance strategies
that rely on the maintenance of ion homeostasis and the reten-
tion of water, among other mechanisms [37]. They can also
abscise leaves under osmotic stress. Mangroves make osmotic
adjustments accordingly. Or take saltbushes (Atriplex sp.).
They have glands that retain salt in the leaves, becoming harm-
less as it crystallizes [38]. Surprise and entropy, one can see, can
vary wildly. In short, plants will try to avoid states that are
surprising—but the specification of what is surprising ‘makes
the plant’. In our salt-avoidance example, the (implicit) belief
that salty outcomes are rare is constituted by the (explicit)
phenotype of the plant.
According to PPP, cascades of sensory input may be sur-
prising to plants, generating a prediction error. A surprising
state for a plant can be one in which it is too salty, or too dry,
to survive. The working hypothesis of PPP therefore is that
plants have an architecture conceived as an anticipatory
engine. If plants are pro-active, anticipatory engines they are
constantly looking ahead, monitoring gradients, guessing
ahead of time what the world is like—so as to adapt to local
conditions via phenotypic plasticity. The aim of the plant is
then to minimize discrepancies, to reduce error as much aspossible, and this can be accomplished through perceptual or
active inference. Under perceptual inference, prediction errors
can be minimized by updating predictions so that they are
brought into line with actual sensory states. As prediction
error is minimized, the plant root system may be said to have
perceived the (gradient of) salt concentrations of the cause of
stress. Once the plant updates its expectations, it expects to
be in salt-water, and if the levels are tolerable, adjust by trigger-
ingmorphological changes (e.g. hardening responses to abiotic
stresses) in response to sensory states.
But ‘inferring the world is a hard place’, so to speak, is not
the only solution available. Probably, if you are the type of
plant that finds itself on the seashore, perceptual inference
is not the best adaptive strategy. Roots may keep track of
the salt gradient, and turn from the source of salt stress. In
this way, plant roots can resample via active inference.
Rather than updating expectations that underwrite predic-
tions, the plant may choose to sample more selectively the
sensory states through nutation movements of the roots—so
that they match the expectations that the plant had. Plants
can thus re-sample their vicinity with a halotropic response
that brings things back on track, into line with predictions
and prior expectations. If the reader finds plant examples
along these lines a hard pill to swallow, just think of
animal vision, where saccades bring about the sampling of
sensory states. In the same way that evidence can be gathered
by visual saccading to make predictions about visual input
[39], a full-fledged active-inferential theory of root nutation
states that nutations constitute the sampling of sensory
states, and that by taking in different parts of the soil struc-
ture roots may gather evidence for predictions [13].
Nothing other is called for.
With that being said, minimization of prediction error is
most likely accomplished through a combination of both per-
ceptual and active inference. Plants perceive and act, and to
alternate appropriately between these two modes calls for
both the assessment and contextual integration of a number
of parameters, and for the capacity to learn. Fortunately, we
now know that plants can do both [4,40]. In fact, we have
considered, for simplicity’s sake, the perception of a single
modality (the perception of salt), but salt-avoidance behav-
iour cannot be assimilated into a response to environmental
stimuli on a one-to-one basis. The halotropic behaviour
observed in plant roots is not a hard-wired salt-avoidance
response [41]. One should bear in mind that plants’ adaptive
behaviour constitutes an integrated response to many different
exogenous and endogenous signalling factors, both biotic and
abiotic [8]. For instance, root halotropism permits seedlings to
bypass patches of salt while weakening or inhibiting the
response to gravity and light [41–43]. As aforementioned,
plant behaviour is soft-wired and is reversible. It is the impli-
cit multimodal integration that accounts for the adaptive
responses observed. On the other hand, we must bear in
mind that plants cannot really afford metabolically costly
mismatches. Developmental modifications and phenotypic
plasticity take time; with changes taking place over time
scales that range from minutes or hours to days and seasons.
They cannot thus afford poor decision-making. Plants must
adjust with respect to future conditions if their behaviour is
to remain adaptive [7,11].
Finally, optimal anticipation requires some form of learn-
ing, however basic, that allows the plant to sculpt its internal
model. Although at first sight this may look like one of the
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suggest that plants may be capable of learning [44,45].
It is thus possible that forms of plant learning may play the
role needed, and that overall integrated signal assessment
(e.g. updating plants’ inner models in order to generate predic-
tions in contexts in which salinity interacts with photo- and
gravitropic responses) can be approached cognitively.
The basic toolkit of plant neurobiology and predictive
processing as herewith sketched may allow us to rethink
more carefully what predictive processing actually implies.
Note that once we consider plants—non-neuronal organ-
isms—a more radical picture begins to emerge. On the other
hand, according to a more conservative approach to PP [46],
action is not considered to make such a big difference with
respect to the basic inferential Helmholtzian framework
(sketched in §2). Were plants to make good predictions, and
the empirical evidence appears to suggest so, it must be due,
someonemaywish to argue, to the fact that plants have evolved
an ‘internal mirror of nature’ [47] that serves their purposes.
In what follows, we discuss how radical PPP could be—by
taking issuewith the idea of plants mirroring nature and there-
fore departing from more conservative PP scenarios. In
particular, we shall elaborate on the following two aspects to
pave the way for a really radical PPP approach: adaptive be-
haviour that while non-neuronal still provides the substrate
for bidirectionality and functional asymmetry (§4); and plant
frugality and embodiment (§5). General conclusions and dis-
cussion about the perception of affordances by plants—as
directions for future research—will follow (§6).4. Non-neural message passing and belief
propagation
Plants, like animals, live surrounded by uncertainty. But how
can plants possibly accomplish prediction error minimization?
In brief, bidirectional, functionally asymmetric flows of proces-
sing are needed to generate predictions and encode prediction
errors [48]. In predictive coding architectures, this usually
entails a downward flow of predictions to sensory organs or
receptors that is reciprocated by an upward flow of prediction
errors that update or adjust physically encoding expectations
(that generate the descending predictions: see §6.3). In other
words, if a sensory mismatch occurs, an error signal propa-
gates upwards, to update internal states of the plant or
creature to account for the discrepancy detected. So, it seems
that all these processing flows are going to require some serious
machinery. In mammals, the neural substrate for this requisite
message passing is pretty handy, with fast neuronal message
passing among the levels of brain (i.e. cortical) hierarchies
by axonal processes. But whether this neuronal machinery
sufficient or not is not the question. Is it necessary?
Fortunately, many organisms may well have the type of
machinery required for predictive coding. Neocortices can cer-
tainly do a lot with their hierarchical structuring, bringing
abstraction beyond that dreamt of for other species. This how-
ever does not mean that something mammalian or neuronal is
needed. What is not negotiable is the functional (predictive)
processing itself, not the substrate details of implementation.
As it turns out, the internal system of plants is, in some impor-
tant respects, similar to the animal nervous system [49], and
although the evidence as to how the free-energy principle is
actually implemented in plants is still forthcoming [13], wemay wonder what sort of non-neural substrate could underlie
PPP.
Plants appear to have all the necessary machinery to
implement the free-energy principle. Plant neurobiology is
beginning to unveil the type of functionally equivalent
machinery in terms of analogues to layered interconnected
patterns of neural firing. Although plants are not equipped
with neurons, Darwin drew a felicitous analogy between
the root tip and the brain of lower animals that resists the
passing of time:It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the tip of the radicle [root]
thus endowed, and having the power of directing the movements
of the adjoining parts, acts like the brain of one of the lower ani-
mals; the brain being seated within the anterior end of the body,
receiving impressions from the sense-organs, and directing the
several movements [50].In fact, phytoneurological structures that play a role analogous
to the nervous system of animals have long been identified. As
J.C. Bose documented in The Nervous Mechanism of Plants [51],
some decades after Darwin’s major work in botany [50,52,53],
there is transmission of excitation between the petiole and the
pulvinus of Mimosa pudica that results in loss of turgor, and
subsequent leaf folding. But electric communication is spread
throughout the plant kingdom, beyond the rapid responses
of Mimosa pudica, Venus flytrap, and the like. Plants, like
animals, fire spikes of voltage. Plant firing may be triggered
by a variety of signals, such as herbivory, variations in illumi-
nation and temperature, mechanical stimulation or salt stress,
among many others. These can result, for example, in changes
in photosynthesis, respiration, or in gene expression. Such
firing—action potentials (APs) and variation potentials (VPs),
also known as slow wave potentials (SWPs) [1,54]—plays a
central role in integrating the plant internal states via the propa-
gation of electric signals. Both APs and VPs (SWPs) share with
animal APs their threefold electrophysiological profile of
depolarization–repolarization–hyperpolarization [55], with
electric signals propagating over short distances through
plasmodesmata (the plant equivalent to intercellular gap junc-
tions in animal tissues), and travelling over long distances—at
least, in the case of APs—along the vascular system (phloem)
in both directions.3
Cellular electrical excitability for the purpose of the trans-
mission of information relies upon the capacity of plant cells
to conduct such signals from receptor to effector sites, despite
the lack of a central nervous system proper [49]. Electrical
events can propagate in the membranes of neural and non-
neural cells alike. In the absence of axons or other projections
for the purpose of conduction, electrical events propagate in
the membranes of plant cells along the vascular system.
Neural-like signalling through the vascular system of plants—
a system that stretches throughout the plant body from root
to shoot in the form of vascular bundles of phloem, xylem
and cambium [59]—underlies in part their phenotypically
plastic responses. Signal integration is implemented, at
the electrical level, via long-distance electrical signalling.
Certain neurotransmitter-like chemicals, and the transport of
auxin as well as other phytohormones [2], underpin the
capacity to integrate signals at the chemical and molecular
levels.4 So, we can see that despite the fact that plants lack
neurons, they can respond in a fast and coordinated
manner to environmental contingencies.
With that being said, if the PPP hypothesis is correct, bidir-
ectional and functionally asymmetric message passing ought
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passing of bottom-up prediction errors and top-down predic-
tions, as exemplified by mammalian neocortical structures, to
be non-negotiable [12]). Importantly, electric communication
can take place over long distances through vascular bundles
located within the transport system of vascular plants, both
top-down andbottom-up.On the other hand, horizontal lateral
signalling over short distances takes places through plasmo-
desmata [56]. Signals passing through local plasmodesmata
networks can thus reach long-distance vascular pathways.
In this way, plants seem to have the type of informational
pathways required to implement PPP.
As in the animal neurobiology literature, plant neurobiol-
ogy entertains the idea of a hierarchical arrangement; in
terms of the distinction between bottom-up, forward and
top-down, backward connections. The requirement of func-
tional asymmetry, however, does not entail that the different
types of non-neural cells are needed. Vascular cells may
‘simply’ exhibit distinct dynamics depending on whether
theymediate predictions or encode error. But theway to propa-
gate top-down and bottom-up signals can vary a lot. Plants
may implement PPP principles either by means of other sub-
strates/cell subpopulations for the same prediction and error
flows, or even exploiting different types of flows of predictions
and errors altogether.
On the other hand, the distinction between forward
and backward connections may be based upon the specificity
of vascular tissues that connect the overall vascular network
of plants, and of intrinsic connections found within each
vascular tissue. One possibility worth exploring is provided
by phloem vascular and apical cells, respectively, exhibiting
different functionalities. Distinct vascular cell populations
may encode expected states of the world and prediction
error, respectively. It is possible that vascular cells in deep
phloem layers serve to encode the former (i.e. mediate
predictions), and apical cells encode the latter (i.e. convey
prediction errors). We elaborate further in §6.
It should also be pointed out, as noted in [24]: ‘even non-
neuronal cells possess many of the same ion channel- and
electrical synapse-based mechanisms as do neurons and use
them for pattern formation and repair’ [60–62]. As to the
way in which cellular dynamics encode particular states, it
is worth noting that although the role of acetylcholine, gluta-
mate, dopamine, serotonin, and other neurotransmitters
found in plants still needs to be clarified [49,57], the possi-
bility that in analogy to the animal neuron, acetylcholine or
dopamine, for example, underlie modulation in neural-like
tissue cannot be discarded. The functional analogues of sig-
nalling molecules, across the plant and animal kingdoms,
have been disclosed recently by the study of neurotrans-
mission in plants. g-Aminobutyric acid, for instance, has
been primarily studied in its metabolic role, although see
[63]. From that perspective, cellular signalling looks pretty
much the same in animal neural and plant networks. In
fact, the way cellular signalling is optimized predates the
evolution of central nervous systems in mammals and the
vascular system of plants. Early in evolution, cellular signal-
ling in somatic networks found a way to coordinate
physiological needs, so that their behaviour could remain
adaptive [64].
The simulations reported in [24] are particularly prescient
for the current argument. These simulations used an ensemble
of free energy minimizing ‘cells’ that employed chemotaxis toself-organize and emulate morphogenesis. Crucially, the che-
motactic signals were generated by the cells themselves,
providing a form of self-assembly thatwasmediated by predic-
tive processing; namely, non-neuronal inference about where
each cell was located in relation to others. In this example, pre-
dictions and prediction errors were encoded by intracellular
macromolecules and extracellular electrochemical gradients.
One way or another, our working hypothesis is that error
correction is implemented by biophysical processeswithin vas-
cular structures [8] that (spatially) organize an exchange with
the world that complies with active inference.
Overall, different organisms may have evolved alternative
strategies to appropriately combine top-down, bottom-up,
and lateral flows. Non-neural patterns of connectivity may
thus allow plants to predict sensory states. The capacity to
anticipate may be implemented for instance in temporal pat-
terns of synchronous oscillatory firing of specific populations
of plant cells [13]. In short, if animal synaptic activity can
bring about active inference, the same in principle applies
to the electrosensitive cells of plants.5. Embodiment and frugality
According to the foregoing, plant cognition can be grounded in
the absence of a neural-based generative model. But by the
same token, strictly speaking, plant cognition is not grounded
either (exclusively) in a non-neural-based functional analogue.
Cognition extends throughout the substrate of plants, their
body and the environment. In this way—focusing upon the
plant body—facts about morphology and the material compo-
sition of plants are crucial. Consider the ‘Yokoi hand’ [65]. This
prosthetic hand was designed with flexible and soft gripping
materials that, courtesy of a particular morphology, could
grip a variety of objects. Importantly, both morphology
and materials deliver the goods—reducing the amount of
predictive control that would be otherwise required. A mor-
phological design embodies the coming together of the finger
tips as the hand itself closes. On the other hand, the type of
material—that the finger tips are made of—fits hand in glove
with the type of objects to be gripped.
If a robotic hand can exhibit a degree of adaptation to
different shapes and contingencies through its material con-
stituency and morphology, the same can be said of plants.
Plants, we may say, compute with their bodies in the service
of adaptive flexible behaviour. Consider a vine climbing up a
host tree for photosynthetic purposes. Vines can attach to
supports in many different ways; insofar as attachment mech-
anisms and stem structure and function are concerned. Their
capacity to cling to host trees resembles pretty much the type
of extended solutions found by morphological roboticists. In
fact, depending on the type of attachment, vines are able to
climb some supports and not others. Thus, tendril and twin-
ing climbers have more efficient climbing mechanisms than
hook-climbers [66]. The stems of the former are more flexible;
those of hook-climbers, more rigid. As a result of their very
phenotypic composition, some climbers can cling to supports
of different diameters. Some redvines make use of jelly-like
fibres allowing the tendrils to squeeze supports. Importantly,
depending on the direction of coiling, the tendrils have their
gelatinous fibres distributed in different ways (e.g. those that
coil always in the same direction have all the fibres on the
concave side [66]). Other anchoring strategies rely on
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potentially climbable [52].
The mechanoreceptor tactile bleps of tendrils of Bryonia
dioica Jacq [67] illustrate nicely one way in which sensory
and effector organs act synergistically in this sort of embo-
died (active) inference. The high density of plasmodesmatal
connections in tendril epidermal cells underwrite the electro-
chemical coordination required for appropriate coiling. But
tendrils do not just respond to pressure. As originally
observed by Pfeffer and Haberlandt [67], sliding movements
on a rough surface are needed. In short, materials and their
properties are put to service in the perception of gradients.
The Yokoi hand–vine plant metaphor takes us to the idea
of frugality. Plants are good at deploying the least complex
model, form or generative model that will serve their needs.
Recall from above that the overarching imperative prescribed
by the free-energy principle is a resolution of uncertainty. If
we unpack this in anthropomorphic terms, it simply means
that actions (at least good actions) will resolve uncertainty.
This is synonymous with selectively gathering evidence
for one’s own existence and choosing behaviours that have
the greatest epistemic value [28,46]. This brings with it the
important notion of epistemic affordance. In other words, senti-
ent plants and creatures behave in a way that resolves
uncertainty about the environment through some form of
epistemic foraging. This sort of affordance goes beyond mini-
mizing surprise (e.g. by avoiding high salt concentrations); in
the sense that the opportunity to resolve uncertainty now
becomes attractive (e.g. deliberately sampling some unex-
plored part of the environment to see whether it has a high
or low salt concentration). One can see immediately that this
is just a way of describing exploration and the intrinsic (episte-
mic) value of certain behaviours that affords the opportunity to
reduce uncertainty (i.e. exploit novelty).6. General discussion and directions for future
research
6.1. The functional anatomy of plants
From the free-energy principle, it follows that plants represent
the causes of sensory stimulation in terms of their internal
states and morphology. Anatomical and physiological con-
straints underlie the capacity of plants to do so. By analogy
with Friston [68], an optimization scheme under a free-
energy formulation allows us to account for a number of
empirical aspects at the level of both plant anatomy and physi-
ology, as summarized in table 1. These aspects range from the
hierarchical arrangement of vascular tissues and the functional
asymmetries between forward and backward connections to
minimal cognition as discussed in plant neurobiology [69].
In table 1 we consider three levels of explanation and predic-
tions: (i) at the level of plant anatomy and connectivity, the
hierarchical deployment of plant vascular tissues and connec-
tions; (ii) at the level of plant electrophysiology, phenomena
like repetition suppression; and (iii) at the psychophysiological
level, the working hypothesis of plant neurobiology is that it
can explain cognitive level phenomena, such as plant priming
[7] and learning [70] (table 1 for details on domains and
predictions).
Consider first the hierarchical vascular organization of
plants. Plants are characteristically modular, with a highlydecentralized architecture. This reflects the evolutionary needs
of sessile organisms, for which a highly centralized system
would not be adaptive. Yet, a hierarchical organization is
needed if predictions and prediction errors are to flow up and
down the plant body. In fact, the modular decentralized archi-
tecture of plants is compatible with a considerable degree of
hierarchical organization. For example, vascular cells are
arranged in layers that converge at both ends, at the root and
shoot apices [71]. At a different level of description, individual
modules in shoots are connected by nodes, and the same goes
for every anatomical subunit of the entire plant body. This
enablesmodules to connect to each other for the purpose of sig-
nalling [72]. Overall, vertical xylem and phloem strands, which
are highly cross-linked by horizontal and tangential anastomo-
sis [59], form a ‘channel and net’ or reticulated structure that
runs throughout the plant [1,55,72,73].
With regard to the electrophysiological and psycho-
physiological domains (table 1), we may consider repetition
suppression and learning [13], respectively. Repetition sup-
pression, a phenomenon in which responses are attenuated
as a result of the repeated presentation of a particular stimulus,
may well take place in plants, with top-down expectations
underlying suppression. With respect to learning, habituation
[44] and associative learning [45], these may well play a func-
tionally equivalent role in plants, in the service of generating
predictions that are informed by a plant’s experience.6.2. The theoretical biology of plants
The two principal themes of functional asymmetry (between
descending predictive and ascending prediction error signals)
and the frugal nature of a plant’s functional architecture speak
to the two fundaments of free-energyminimization outlined in
this article. In particular, the frugal, complexity minimizing
structure of plants—well suited to their world—follows natu-
rally from the minimization of free energy. This follows from
the mathematical equivalence between free energy and (Baye-
sian) evidence for a generativemodel [16]. In otherwords, if we
associate the structural and dynamical form of a plant with a
model of its eco-niche, then any process that minimizes free
energy will necessarily maximize model evidence. Because
the plant is the model—it is basically self-evidencing [46].
This can be seen at a practical level in everyday statistical
analysis where it is known as Bayesian model selection.
The same arguments have been applied in the context of evol-
ution—such that selective pressure is simply the process of
free-energy minimization playing out at an evolutionary
time scale [74–76]. In short, natural selection is nature’s
way of performing Bayesian model selection. A key insight
here is that evidence is the difference between accuracy and
model complexity. In other words, a good model with high evi-
dence will provide an accurate explanation for sensory
exchange with the environment, while minimizing its
complexity.
Complexity can be thought of as the degrees of freedom
used by the plant to anticipate and predict its sensory exchange.
This leads naturally to a principle of minimum redundancy
(well established in the neurosciences [77]), whereby a good
plant will retain just those sparse, frugal structures that are
necessary to anticipate the world. This can be evident in the
phenotypic form (as unpacked earlier by analogy with robotic
gloves) or in terms of conditional dependencies and ‘action at
a distance’ mediated in plants by channels and electrochemical
Table 1. Structural and functional aspects of the plant vascular system that may be explained under a free-energy (predictive processing) formulation.
domain prediction
anatomy and connectivity:
explains the hierarchical deployment of plant vascular bundles,
architectures with forward and backward (bidirectional) connections
[1,54,55,57,58]
— hierarchical vascular organization
— distinct vascular cell populations, encoding expectations and prediction
error. Crucially, these distinct populations should be reciprocally
connected because, algorithmically, every biophysical encoding of an
expectation passes messages or signals to an associated prediction
error population and vice versa
— forward connections convey prediction errors from mechanoreceptors
and chemoreceptors (e.g. on apical cells) and backward connections
mediate predictions (e.g. from deep vascular cell bundles)
— functional asymmetries in forwards (linear) and backwards (nonlinear)
connections are mandated by nonlinearities in the generative model
encoded by top-down backward connections conveying predictions
— vascular cells elaborating predictions (e.g. deep vascular cell bundles)
could show distinct (low-pass) dynamics, relative to those encoding
error (e.g. cells in root and shoot apices). This follows from the fact
that expectations accumulate evidence from prediction errors; thereby
suppressing fast (high-frequency) ﬂuctuations in prediction errors
— recurrent dynamics are intrinsically stable because they suppress prediction
error. In other words, if cells encoding errors excite cells encoding
expectations, expectations should inhibit errors—or vice versa
electrophysiology:
explains the prevalence of action potentials (APs) and variation
potentials (VPs), also known as slow wave potentials (SWPs), in plant
electrophysiology [54–58]
— sensory responses are greater for surprising, unpredictable or
incoherent stimuli (e.g. sudden changes in salt concentration or
mechanical stimulation)
— the attenuation of responses encoding prediction error, with
perceptual learning. In other words, we would predict that regular
ﬂuctuating mechanical, photic or chemical stimulation will entrain
plant electrophysiology—and that these induced responses should
decay with repetition—and re-emerge with novel stimuli—or,
importantly, an omission
psychophysiology:
accounts for the behavioural correlates (e.g. growth and phenotypic
changes) of physiological phenomena [1]
— predictive processing furnishes a framework in which to model and
understand priming and learning phenomena in plants of the sort that
underlies omission related responses (see above) and experience
dependent plasticity in the way top-down predictions are formed
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cal synaptic transmission in the brain). In short, under the
free-energy principle—and the active inference that this
entails—one would anticipate that plants would come to
distil the essential causal structure in their environment
in terms of their physical form and biophysical function.
It is this form and functional architecture that constitutes the
generative model and underwrites their existence.6.3. Predictive coding in plants
The dynamics within this generative model (e.g. plant)
correspond to signalling of the sort associatedwith belief propa-
gation in the brain. This implicit (Bayesian) message passing is
simply a description of dynamics that maximize Bayesian
model evidence (or minimize free energy). This can manifestin many forms. A popular example is predictive coding in the
brain [17,18]. The crucial aspect of these dynamics (variously
known as variational message passing, belief propagation, pre-
dictive coding etc.) is an asymmetry in the messages that are
passed on the internal states generating predictions. Interest-
ingly, one can always formulate a free energy minimizing
scheme in terms of prediction errors, if the generative model
calls upon probability distributions within the exponential
family [78]. This is just a technical way of saying that it is more
than likely that any plant or creature can be described (at
least mathematically) as passing predictions and predic-
tion errors around its body in the service of minimizing
prediction error.
Finally, it is worth noting that the very idea of plant percep-
tion seems to turn upside down our very intuitions as to what
perception and action entail. In this context, one can consider
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the perception of affordances. If plants are sentient and behav-
ing organisms, then plant perception and action are driven
primarily by anticipatory routines triggered in the plant’s
body. At this point we can see how radical PPP can actually
be. Plants are surprised by the unexpected, and their capacity
to navigate uncertain terrains may therefore depend on a cas-
cade of top-down predictions, constantly predicting
incoming signals. As in the case of pea roots that can predict
the future [7], anticipatory behaviour is crucial for adaptive,
surprise eluding, success.
Vines provide the sharpest contrast with conservative PP
scenarios. Grasping, say, a phone, according to Hohwy [46]
can only be explained via the exploitation of an internal rep-
resentation of the phone itself. But once PP is fully developed
with fast and frugal,morphological, andnon-neurally decentra-
lized resources, we can see that detailed internal representations
may not be necessary: a climbing plant does not grasp a sup-
port because it has an internal representation of it, but rather
because of the soft-assembling of the plant body–environment
in the context of the approaching manoeuvres. In other
words, the tendrils of the plant do not call upon representations
of the affordance to climb: they are, in and of themselves, the
generative model which realizes that affordance.
The very exploitation of ecological information within a PP
framework permits us to envisage really radical predictive pro-
cessing solutions like those be leveraged by plants. That plants
can perceive ecological information is not the big news. Turvey
et al. [79] considered how Monstera gigantea, a climbing vine,
could perceive a form of climb-ability, as this plant would
grow skototropically towards darkness [5]. Thus, vines can
perceive possibilities for action, but to fully understand this
‘perception’, we need to bear in mind that the vine and its
support are functionally coupled by the predictions of ‘experi-
enced’ plants. Vines control their approaching manoeuvre to
the support by anticipating sensory states, and realizing the
states through embodied action.
Plants are a good example of radical predictive processing
because they are not in the business of enriching a neurocentric
model of their surroundings (this is effectively outsourced to
natural selection); rather, they are in the business of appropri-
ately coupling with it. A movement of circumnutation, for
instance, is triggered, maintained andmodified endogenously,
or at least that is our working hypothesis. Taking into account
that many growth-relatedmovements are irreversible, explora-
tionmust be accomplished efficiently. Control is thus needed, if
the metabolic and computational cost of irreversible but idle
movements is to be minimized.These considerations suggest an understanding of
plant cognition radically different—not only with respect to
mainstream cognitive science, but also to conservative
approaches to PP. When we say that plants are proactively
engaged with their surroundings we mean literally that
they foresee possibilities of interaction with their local
environment ahead of time. But it is important to emphasize
that this needs to be so. A plant that only represents sensory
inputs as they flow past would be dead meat. This is so pre-
cisely because they move slowly and cannot afford to react
reflexively in response to the present. Plants, despite the
slowness of their responses, can exploit distal nutrient-related
or reproduction-related causes in their eco-niche. In short,
they need to deal with contingencies ahead of time—because
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think for a moment of halophilic archaebacteria (‘salt bacteria’). They
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